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Abstract
We develop a model in which social pressure on a rm to behave well is jointly
produced by a state regulator (EPA) and an NGO. The EPA and NGO di¤er in how
they trade-o¤ business versus environmental interests and also have access to di¤erent
instruments in pursuit of their objectives. EPA and NGO e¤orts may be strategic
complements or substitutes, depending upon circumstances. We present a taxonomy of
outcomes in the game between EPA and NGO in the spirit of Fudenberg and Tiroles
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1 Introduction
Firms are subject to pressure from society to behave well. Respect for the environment,
eschewing child labor and exploitative labor practices, treating suppliers fairly, etc. are costly,
so prot-motivated rms are tempted to cut corners. However, bad behavior, if detected, can
also be hazardous to a rms bottom line. In addition to the legal penalties that may result
from breaking laws, rms face social or reputational penalties for being exposed as behaving
badly. These penalties can be large, which explains recent interest in concepts such as social
license, informal regulationand beyond compliance behavior.
There is no universally-agreed denition of social license in the management literature.
Broadly speaking a rm is said to hold social license if it enjoys community or public support
for its activities. There are many reasons why a business can perform better nancially
when community attitudes towards it are positive, implying that loss of support imposes a
penalty. Firms - particularly those operating in key sectors where social license is critical -
will invest substantially to avoid losing it. In mining, Prno and Solocombe (2012, page 346)
note that a social license exists when a rm is seen as having broad, ongoing approval and
acceptance of society to conduct its activitiessuch that nurturing social license is ... one of
the most signicant challenges that mining companies face. Informal regulation is a closely-
related concept and can be viewed as follows; When (formal penalties) are weak or absent,
communities can often use other channels to force pollution abatement by local factories in a
process of informal regulation(Pargal and Wheeler (1996: 1314)).
In most settings social pressure is something that is jointly produced by the actions of
state (regulators) and non-state (NGO) actors. Typically the regulator and NGO can be
expected to have di¤erent objectives (the former pursuing welfare, the latter more focussed
on environmental outcomes), as well as access to di¤erent instruments. This means that
the regulator, NGO and representative rm are in a three-way game, seeking strategically to
inuence community support to their own ends. In the context of a simple model that captures
this interaction strategically, we develop a taxonomy of strategies - in the spirit of Fudenberg
and Tiroles (1984) taxonomy of strategies for businesses in a competitive environment - that
characterizes the roles of the state regulator and the NGO as a function of some key underlying
parameters.
Further, very often citizens do not engage in the application of pressure themselves. Rather,
by donating money (or other support) to an NGO or activist organization, they delegate their
bidding to a third party. Given this, it is natural to ask the following question: If I am a
citizen with a particular set of preferences - dened by how I weigh environmental and non-
environmental outcomes - what sort of NGO objectives would I want to support with my
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donation? One that is sensitive to business interests, or one that attaches little or no weight
to them? In our framework we show that a citizen typically will not wish to support an NGO
with the same objectives as his or her own. Rather, in general the citizen will understand
that the citizens ends are better served by delegating the ghting of the battle to an NGO
whose preferences over environmental versus non-environmental outcomes are systematically
di¤erent in comparison to the preferences of the citizen.
In terms of the development of knowledge in this area the analysis allows us to speak to
two questions. The rst is how the roles of state enforcer and NGO t together in a context in
which compliance pressure is jointly produced, for instance settings in which social license to
operate is important. The second relates to the question of what is the appropriate objective
function with which to endow NGOs in our models. Existing models start with an ad hoc
assumption about NGO objectives - usually based either on impact (for example Heyes and
Martin (2015)) aggregate environmental damage (for example Heyes and Kapur (2012)) or
a variant there-on. Our approach endogenizes the objective function that the activist group
seeks to maximize, deriving it from (but not equating it to) the tastes of donors.
The second element ts into a wider literature on strategic delegation in other contexts.
In Rogo¤ (1985) a politician with a particular taste for ination and unemployment delegates
control of monetary policy to a central banker more conservative (ination-hating) than the
politician. In Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) a prot-maximising shareholder
delegates the running of the rm to a chief whos objective function is not prot-maximization.
In Heyes and Kapur (2011) a welfare-maximizing government appoints an EPA chief who is not
welfare-oriented. In each case the appointment is instrumental - it makes credible a pattern of
responses in a subsequent game that is to the ultimate benet of the principal. In our setting
the donor is the principal, and by donating to a particular NGO, the principal appoints that
entity as agent to do the bidding on behalf of the principal.
The rst complements a number of strands of research on the social behaviors of rms.
There is a substantial body of theoretical and empirical research on corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) and behavior that goes beyond compliance (Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995)
and Pargal and Wheeler (1996)). Related to this is the recent urry of work on private
politics(Baron (2001, 2009), Baron and Diermeier (2007)). A second literature seeks to use
formal methods to understand the organization and strategies of the social advocacy sector
(Heyes and Martin (2015, 2016), Aldashev and Verdier (2009)). With particular focus on
community pressure, Heyes and Kapur (2012) develop a model in which a rm engages in
CSR in order to maintain community support and/or to regain the support of the community
once it has been lost. They characterize how these incentives interact with formal regulatory
interventions. Aldashev and Verdier (2013) analyze the e¤ect of NGO pressure on industry
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equilibrium (intensity of competition, market structure, and the share of socially responsible
rms) and characterize the impact of industry-level changes (market size, consumer tastes)
on NGO activism. Heyes and Maxwell (2004) model the interplay of a hypothetical World
Environmental Organization and an NGO and nd that lawsuits by private citizens crowd
in public monitoring but crowd out public sanctions. Lambertini et al (2016) and Planer-
Friedrich and Sahm (2017) outline a delegation approach to CSR. Walter and Chang (2017)
analyse the welfare impacts of environmental regulations in the presence of green consumers.
And nally, with an empirical focus Langpap and Shimshack (2010) present empirical evidence
on the extent to which private environmental prosecutions crowd out - or crowd in - public
monitoring and public enforcement e¤orts.
1.1 Joint Production of Social Pressure: Motivation and Model
Preview
The starting point for the analysis that follows is the recognition that the pressure on rms
to behave well - informal regulatory pressure - is jointly produced by governmental and non-
governmental actors.
For the purposes of formal modeling we will treat these as single entities and refer to
them generically as an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and a Non-governmental
Organization (NGO). The EPA and NGO can be expected to have di¤erent objectives - the
former pursuing welfare, the latter more interested in environmental outcomes - as well as
di¤erent levers that they can use to further their aims.
A central assumption that we will make is that the EPA has the means to identify certain
corporate behaviors, while the NGO inuences public hostility to exposed bad behavior. Of
course this will not be realistic in every setting, but is a reasonable approximation in many
settings.1 In our model we keep things stark. The EPA will choose the probability that
bad behavior by a rm is exposed. It might do this through: (1) conducting inspections and
publishing results (NGOs do not have the same rights to access plants and conduct inspections
that regulators do); (2) requiring submission of data from polluters and disseminating it;
1The EPA may also have the power to levy nancial penalties, but these penalties are often small compared
to reputational losses (Heyes (2001)). Equally too activist groups may in some contexts play a role in the
detection of wrongdoing. For example in the recent VW emissions scandal it was an NGO that conducted the
testing that bought the wrongdoing to light. Couttenier et al (2016) develop a model in which an NGO is
selective in the information it passes on to citizens. In such a pure disclosure game the NGO does not expend
e¤ort generating primary information, so presumably it often obtains the information that it has from gov-
ernmental or other publicly available sources. For example, the International Council of Clean Transportation
(ICCT) Ranking of Transatlantic Airline Fuel E¢ ciency, that the authors use as a motivating example in that
paper, combines data from publicly available travel web-sites with data on fuel use and tra¢ c occupancy rates
reported to the US Department of Transportation (see ICCT (2015)).
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and/or (3) mandating direct disclosure by rms of information about various elements of their
social impact, or in other ways. The NGO will inuence community attitudes to wrongdoing,
including the hostility of the social atmosphere; and therefore will inuence the size of the
social penalty a rm su¤ers if its bad behavior is exposed.2 This sort of division has been
noted by researchers and practitioners in the environmental eld: Regulators are learning the
value ... of NGOs to help achieve environmental goals. Information regulation strategies, for
example, are explicitly designed to empower NGOs (give them the information they need) to
impose informal sanctions on rms based on their environmental record, (INECE (2005)).3
The relationship between the NGO and EPA is symbiotic - they need each other.
To summarize the assumption in a phrase: In our model the EPA does the naming, the
NGO does the shaming. To take a non-environmental analogue, while the e¤orts of Mothers
Against Drunk Driving (MADD) over the last 30 years have substantially heightened the social
vilication faced by people caught driving under the inuence of alcohol, it still requires the
police to pull-over and breathalyze miscreants.
The regulator in the model maximizes welfare (equally-weighted sum of compliance and
operating costs and environmental damage), while the NGO usually overweighs environmental
outcomes. This implies that there is tension between the two; they are not aligned in their
preferred outcomes. The strategic interaction between the regulator and NGO in this set-up,
and the properties of the resulting pattern of incentives that they jointly-produce, is our focus.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows.
In Section 2 we develop and solve a stylized model of the game between EPA and NGO.
The key assumptions embedded in the model are: (a) formal penalties are limited (in fact
zero) so that the state regulator must rely on social penalties (social disapproval) to discourage
polluting behavior;4 (b) the primary tool available to the regulator is information provision;
2A social penalty might take various form and the precise form is not important to us here. Gunningham
et al (2004: 321)) report that: Managers at BC4 told us that the sanction they feared most for breaching
regulations were not legal but informal sanctions imposed by the public and the media, they were motivated
less by avoiding regulatory violations per se than by avoiding anything that could give you a bad name.
Econometric evidence of the substantial size of social penalties is provided by Badrinath and Bolster (1996),
and Pargal and Wheeler (1996) amongst others.
3We use the term bad behavior loosely - it may or may not correspond to a rms failure to satisfy a
formal legal requirement. The literature on community right-to-know provisions in general and the US Toxic
Release Inventory in particular demonstrates the potential power of information provision in this context. In
Canada, the environmental scorecardpublished by the BC provincial government outlining environmental
performance indicators was, according to one mill manager a pretty e¤ective tool. If you have recurring
environmental problems you come up on the list. That keeps you in compliance because public pressure is
more demanding than the regulatory agencies(Gunningham et al (2004: 330)).
4Reputation here, however, is a social construct rather than something that emerges from a Bayesian
updating process. This parallels Abito, Besanko and Diermeier (2015: 5): Our notion of reputation is
consistent with that employed in the sociology and management literatures - it is a social construct reecting
the publics subjective attitudes towards a company (Bermiss, Zajac and King (2013). It is not a posterior
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(c) the hostility of the social atmosphere into which evidence of wrong-doing is published
can be inuenced by attitude-leadership by an NGO; and (d) the EPA and NGO may have
di¤erent objectives - in particular the latter overweighs environmental outcomes over industry
interests - and are strategic in how they behave.
An insight of the model is that in making decisions about how much e¤ort to invest in a
hostile social atmosphere, the strategic NGO will have regard not only to the direct e¤ect on
rms, but also to the induced changes in the actions of the EPA - its partnerin the creation
of social pressure. The e¢ cacy of its own actions to whip-up a more hostile social atmosphere
may be o¤-set if the EPA responds by scaling back the intensity of its own information-
provision e¤orts.5 In other circumstances the EPA may be induced to expand that intensity,
and the NGO will be motivated to push even harder to exploit such crowding-in e¤ects. In
parallel the EPA, as a strategic actor in its own right, will realize that the intensity of the
information provision program that it operates will inuence the incentive that the NGO has
to invest in a hostile community atmosphere. We characterize the reaction functions in the
game between EPA and NGO. As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), and as the discussion in the
previous paragraph suggests, critical to incentives in any given context turn out to be whether
EPA and NGO intensity choices are strategic complements or substitutes. This depends in
turn on a constellation of parameters. Taxonomic in character, the model generates numerous
new insights that are inevitably missing from analyses (the existing literature) that fail to
recognize that social pressures are jointly-produced by state and non-governmental actors.
While the taxonomy is insightful, providing as it does the rst rigorous treatment of the
joint production of social pressure, in Section 3 we use it as a building block to think about
strategic delegation in activism. In particular we treat the NGOs objective function - the
weight that the NGO places on environmental as opposed to non-environmental outcomes -
as an institution-design parameter that it can choose in a pre-game. We caricature this as
appointing an NGO chiefof a particular disposition, but the weight can equally be thought
of as embedded in the practices and protocols within an NGO that determine its advocacy
choices.6 The question is: If citizens have a particular set of tastes, what type of objective
function must an NGO have to attract their support?
Section 4 concludes.
belief about hidden information as in a model with informed and uninformed players.
5EPA thought process: If the social atmosphere is such that every revealed wrong-doer faces an enormous
social penalty, then to maximise welfare we only need to catch and reveal wrong-doing with small probability.
6Major environmental advocacy groups are widely-understood to vary in how sensitive they are to business
interests, which in turn shapes their demands (Yaziji and Doh (2009)).
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2 Model
2.1 Setup
Consider an industry made up of a large number of rms. Each rm makes a binary decision
to engage in behavior that is either good(a = 1) or bad(a = 0). For convenience we will
use the terms compliance (a = 1) and non-compliance (a = 0) as equivalents, but that should
be understood to have wider interpretation than satisfaction of some formal legal requirement.
Compliance is costly for the rms with cost represented by c. Firms are heterogenous - they
vary in how costly they nd it to behave well - and c is distributed according to distribution
function F with corresponding density function f . The rm knows the realized value c, but
others know only the distribution F from which it is drawn. For simplicity we restrict attention
to the case in which c is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. The taxonomy that we develop turns
out to be very rich, so it is unlikely that allowing for a more general distribution would deliver
more insight.
There are two entities that between them determine the incentives facing rms to com-
ply: an EPA and an NGO. These two regulatorshave di¤erent instruments and di¤erent
objectives. Social penalties are jointly-produced by their actions. In general, the coercive
tools available to it mean that the EPA has a comparative advantage in information gathering
(through inspection programs, mandatory disclosure requirements, and so on) and NGOs in
inuencing community attitudes towards bad behavior. The relationship between the EPA
and NGO is symbiotic. The NGO relies on the EPA to identify badly behaving rms. The
EPA needs the NGO to use its inuence to whip-uppublic anger towards this particular type
of bad behavior. The EPA and NGO understand that they are strategically interdependent
and interact non-cooperatively. It is worth making explicit here that we do not analyse the
case in which multiple NGOs co-exist and may compete (or collaborate) in pursuing their
various objectives.
The EPA operates an information regime - which for shorthand we will call an inspection
policy - which detects non-compliance with probability p. Inspection is costly for the EPA,
with an associated cost function (p), where  is increasing and convex in p and 0(0) = 0.
To generate closed-form solutions of the game we will adopt a quadratic cost assumption;
(p) = 1=2p2, with 0 <  < 1. In some settings if the EPA detects non-compliance the
rm may have to pay a formal penalty or ne  . However these nes are often small and not
in themselves su¢ cient to create enough audit pressureto motivate compliance among all
rms. In order to focus on social or informal penalties, and the strategic interaction between
the EPA and the NGO, we set  = 0, i.e. there is no penalty for non-compliance from the
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EPA.
The assumption that  = 0 is worth reecting on here. In many practical settings penalties
that the EPA has at their disposal, while likely not zero, can be comparatively small, and
certainly short of what would be needed to ensure full-compliance with the rules that they
police. This will not apply, of course, in every industry or every jurisdiction. The assumption
of restricted penalties is a fairly common one in the regulatory enforcement literature (for some
important early examples see Harrington (1988), Heyes (1996), Heyes and Rickman (1999),
Kambhu (1989)). It also motivates the practical and academic interest in community-imposed
or informal regulatory penalties where formal penalties are sparse (Pargal and Wheeler (1996),
Heyes and Kapur (2012)). Harrington (1988) outlines a series of justications for assuming
that penalties are restricted, often severely: In most states there is a restriction on the size
of penalty that can be levied ... (E)ven when a maximum ne is not imposed by statute
there may be practical of political limits to the size of penalties. Sever but rarely imposed
penalties might seem capricious and unfair.American readers should note that historically
penalties have tended to be much more restricted outside the US. For example, Hawkins
(1983) observes that: The reference to the low level of sanction is made with the British
position in mind. The American regulatory agency is armed with legal sanctions fearsome in
comparison.(Hawkins (1983: 69)). Our assumption that EPA penalties are not just limited
but zero is, of course, a stark one, and not realistic in most settings. However it maintains a
sharp separation of powers between the EPA and NGO in our model which we believe to be
helpful. In Heyes and Oestreich (2018), the online Appendix to this paper, we establish that
relaxing this assumption has little impact on the qualitative results.
The NGO has no capacity to audit rms - it relies on information from the information-
gathering endeavours of the EPA. However it is able to inuence public opinion, that is create
a negative reaction by social-minded citizens if the rm is shown to be out of compliance.
This results in a negative payo¤ or social penalty to the rm denoted by . That social
penalty is the nancial value associated with the diminution of social license. But inuencing
public attitudes is costly for the NGO - it may have to run adverts, print leaets, engage
in educative and persuasive campaigns to sensitize people to the issue at hand. The size of
the social penalty depends on the costly e¤orts by the NGO, reected by cost function (),
where  is increasing and convex in  and 0(0) = 0. We will use the following quadratic
cost function () = 1=22, with 0 <  < 1, to ensure closed-form solutions. Variable 
can be thought of as the society level of alertness towards NGO messaging. When  is
small, a society is alerttowards an issue and it is relatively cheap for the NGO to inuence
public attitudes; when  is large, a society is inattentivetowards an issue and it is relatively
expensive for the NGO to inuence public attitudes. That NGO cost is assumed insensitive
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to prevalence of non-compliance in the regulated population reects our focus on the role of
an NGO in inducing social contempt for a particular sort of behavior (such as drink driving,
failure of a rm to pay minimum wage or to dispose of waste product legally), rather than
against a particular non-compliance incident.
Firms and regulators move in sequence. At stage one, rms decide whether or not to
comply with the standard. One can think of this as a rm making investment or product
design decisions, adopting management practices, that are either good or bad for society. At
stage two, EPA and NGO choose simultaneously the inspection probability and the social
atmosphere into which the audit reports are published.7
Industry Consider a rm of type c. The payo¤ when complying with the standard is
(a = 1) =  c, while the rms payo¤ for non-compliance and instead facing the expected
social penalty in case of detection is (a = 0) =  p. Hence, a rm does comply if:
c  p:
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution function F (c) and the fraction of rms that
will comply and those that will not comply with the standard. Given the uniform distribution
of c, the probability that a rm complies is Pr(c  p), i.e.: F (p) = p. Hence, the expected
fraction of rms that comply is p and the expected fraction of rms that do not comply is
(1  p).8
*** Figure 1 here ***
7This seems to use the most natural sequence of events. In some setting it may be more appropriate to
think of the EPA moving rst and with commitment power. In Heyes and Oestreich (2018) we establish that
modeling in this alternative way has almost no e¤ect on the qualitative results of the analysis. We are grateful
to a referee for encouraging us to test the robustness of results to this change.
8Lyon (2012) writes Perhaps the most important reward o¤ered by NGOs is public endorsement of a
corporations environmental actions through a partnership with that company. [..] Perhaps the most important
harms wielded by NGOs are the threat of a consumer boycott of a rms products and, more generally, the
sullying of a rms reputation in the media.In essence the model at hand captures the second, but not the
rst e¤ect. However, consider the following extension: If audited and found to be in compliance, the rm
benets because the NGO has directed the public atmosphere accordingly. Thus, while  represents the social
penalty created by an NGO, a fraction of  is added to the rms prots in case to be found in compliance such
as , where  < 1. The key inequality c  p describing industry behaviour would change to c + p  p
or c  p(1  ). The current model concentrates on the special case in which  = 0.
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EPA The EPAs objective is to minimize a social loss functionW which comprises rms
compliance costs, the environmental damage associated with cases of non-compliance, the costs
of the NGO and the costs of inspections.
Note, the costs c of all complying rms are in the interval [0; p] so that the rmsexpected
cost of compliance is the expected value of c in [0; p]. That is,
pZ
0
cf(c)dc:
The fraction of rms that do not comply (1   p) cause social damage D(:) which is
increasing and convex. For tractability we assume quadratic damages; D(:) = 1=2(1  p)2,
with 0 <  < 1.
Putting all this together, the EPA chooses detection probability p in order to minimize
the social loss function W :
min
p
W =  
pZ
0
cf(c)dc  1=2(1  p)2   1=22   1=2p2: (1)
In raising p the EPA trades-o¤ the lower damages resulting from the higher number of
rms in compliance against higher costs to the industry and higher enforcement cost. In the
following, we focus on interior solutions. In the Nash outcome the EPA will take the social
atmosphere  created by the NGO as given. The rst-order condition @W=@p = 0 is given by:
 p2 + (1  p)  p = 0.
The rst-order condition leads to the best-response function (BRF) for the audit rate p for
any given social atmosphere  chosen by the NGO:
p() =

 + 2(1 + )
: (2)
We note in passing that a second order su¢ cient condition for a cost minimum @W 2=@2p <
0 is satised. Inspecting the best-response function of the EPA (2) leads to:
Proposition 1 The audit rate p selected by the EPA is increasing in the severity of envi-
ronmental damage  and decreasing in the cost of inspection . It is non-monotonic in the
prevailing social atmosphere : If  is small, an increase in it induces the EPA to increase
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inspection intensity (actions are strategic complements). If  is large, an increase in it induces
the EPA to decrease inspection intensity (actions are strategic substitutes).
The result that p is increasing in  and it is decreasing in  is intuitive: The more severe
the environmental damage associated with non-compliance  the higher the audit rate p. In
contrast, the more costly it is for the EPA to conduct audits, the lower the audit rate.
The impact of  on p is interesting as it is non-monotonic as described by the Proposition.
In fact, p() has a maximum where @p()=@ = 0 which occurs at:
 =
r

1 + 
:
That means, if the social penalty is relatively small, i.e.:  < , p is a strategic complement
for  and if the penalty is large, i.e.:  > , p is a strategic substitute for . Put di¤erently: there
are two o¤setting impacts when the NGO increases . On the one hand, a larger  increases the
marginal e¤ectiveness of information provision by the EPA. Because its instrument becomes
more e¤ective, the EPA may choose to use it more. On the other hand, increasing , means
that the industry becomes subject to further scrutiny, which, at some point, may be too large
from the point of view of the EPA. In that case, the EPA may contract its own e¤orts.
We will see below that the equilibrium value  can be smaller or larger than . That means,
the equilibrium actions of the EPA to the actions of the NGO can be strategic complements
or strategic substitutes. This non-monotonicity turns out to have important implications for
how keen the NGO will be to devote e¤ort to developing a more hostile social atmosphere.
Beyond some point it recognizes that its own e¤orts to generate harder incentives for good
behavior are partly- or fully-o¤set by the induced decrease in the inspection intensity chosen
by the EPA.
NGO The NGO cares about environmental quality and industry costs to various de-
grees. Certainly, NGOs vary in how puregreen they are. Di¤erent NGOs place di¤erent
weights on the bottom line of industries. Some environmental NGOs such as WWF and the
Environmental Defense Fund, in designing their campaigns are understood to be sensitive to
the business and economic implications of their actions. They emphasize collaboration and
solutions that improve the environment and increase prots at the same time. Others such
as Greenpeace and the Rainforest Action Network are a deeper green, with little or no regard
for the nancial implications that their actions might have on polluting sectors (Yaziji and
Doh (2009) provide an excellent summary of the revealed operational objectives of a number
of the most important environmental NGOs).
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We operationalize this by saying that the objective function of an NGO is a weighted
sum of environmental damage and compliance costs to the industry, but the NGO always
over-weights environmental outcomes in comparison to the EPA (this is what makes it an
environmental NGO). Finally, the NGO cares about its own campaigning cost. So for a given
audit rate p the problem of the NGO is to choose social penalty  in order to minimize the
loss function Z:
min

Z =  
pZ
0
cf(c)dc  (1  )(1=2((1  p))2)  1=22.
The parameter  2 [0; 1=2) is the weight on industry costs - a lower value of  is associated
with an NGO that places greater weight on environmental quality; in other words the NGO is
deepergreen.9 For some NGOs,  = 0 which is the case when the NGO does not care about
industry costs at all. For now we take that value as exogenous, later we explore how an NGO
might wish to manipulate it strategically and instrumentally to further progress its goals.
In raising  the NGO trades-o¤ the reduced damages from the smaller number of rms
in non-compliance against higher industry costs and higher enforcement cost. The rst-order
condition @Z=@ = 0 is given by:
 p2 + (1  )p(1  p)   = 0.
The rst-order condition leads to the BRF for the social penalty  for any given audit rate p
chosen by the EPA:
(p) =
p (1  ) 
 + p2(+ (1  ) ) (3)
We note in passing that a second order su¢ cient condition for a cost minimum @Z2=@2 < 0
is satised. Inspecting the best-response function of the NGO (3) leads to the following
Proposition:
Proposition 2 The social atmosphere implemented by the NGO is increasing in the severity
of environmental damage  and decreasing in the cost of inspection  and weight . It is
9We thank two anonymous referees for the question of robustness of our main results when the EPAs cost
factor into the NGOs loss function. One referee has noted that the modeling choices made with regard to
the EPA and NGO objective functions introduce a particular type of asymmetry. While the EPA weighs the
costs of the NGO, the NGO attaches no weight to the costs incurred by the EPA. While we retain this as our
preferred specication in the body of the manuscript, we establish in Heyes and Oestreich (2018) that relaxing
this assumption - assuming that the NGO internalize, to some extent, the costs of the EPA - has little impact
on results.
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non-monotonic in the intensity of the EPAs inspection intensity: If p is small, an increase
in it induces the NGO to increase social penalty (actions are strategic complements). If p is
large, an increase in it induces the NGO to reduce the social penalty (actions are strategic
substitutes).
These results deliver the best-response function of the NGO. The social penalty  is in-
creasing in the severity of damage  and it is decreasing in the cost of auditing  and weight
. The intuition is straight-forward: the more costly it is for the NGO to create the social
penalty or the more the NGO cares about the bottom line of rms, the lower the created so-
cial penalty. Also, the more severe the damages from non-compliance  the higher the social
penalty .
The impact of p on  is interesting as it is non-monotonic as described by the Proposition.
In fact, (p) has a maximum where @(p)=@p = 0, which is equivalent to:
p =
s

(+ (1  )) :
Wewill see below that the equilibrium value p can be smaller or larger than p. That means,
the equilibrium actions of the EPA can be strategic complements or strategic substitutes. In
other words, if the audit rate is relatively small, i.e.: p < p,  is a strategic complement for p
and if the audit rate is large, i.e.: p > p,  is a strategic substitute for p. Put di¤erently: there
are two o¤setting impacts when the EPA increases p. On the one hand, a larger p increases
the marginal e¤ectiveness of social penalization by the NGO. Because its instrument becomes
more e¤ective, the NGO may choose to use it more. On the other hand, increasing p, means
that the industry becomes subject to further scrutiny, which, at some point, may be too large
even from the point of view of the NGO (unless  = 0). In that case, the EPA may contract
its own e¤orts.
2.2 Taxonomy of Strategies
The Nash Equilibrium (NE) occurs where the two best-response functions of the EPA (2)
and the best-response function of the NGO (3) intersect, i.e. at the equilibrium, there is no
incentive to deviate for either entity.
*** Figure 2 here ***
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Figure 2 illustrates the NE p and  and the maxima of the two best-response functions
p and  respectively. We can anticipate that the signs of the slopes of the respective players
reactions functions are likely to dictate the properties of any particular NE, so it is natural
to let the maxima of the best-response functions (which we will denote p and ) partition
the action set of EPA and NGO into four quadrants. Depending on context - as described
by di¤erent constellations of parameters - the NE may occur in quadrant I, II or III based
on parameter values. We are able to rule out the possibility that it occurs in quadrant IV .
In section IV the EPA actions are strategic complements and the NGO actions are strategic
substitutes. However, given that the NGO overweights environmental interests it can never
be optimal for the NGO to decrease activities (when EPA increases its own activities) in a
situation where EPA would increase activities (when NGO increases its activities).
In the case illustrated in Figure 2, for example, the NE is in section III. Here, the actions
of the NGO are strategic complements in the vicinity of equilibrium. That means, the more
the EPA audits the rms (increasing p), the higher the NGO chooses the social penalty  to
be (the more heavily it invests in whipping up community hostility). Equally, if the NGO
increases , the EPA response with increasing p. Table 1 shows the other possible strategy
combinations of EPA and NGO that could occur in equilibrium.
The policy relevance of these segments can be explained through situations of relative
strength and/or weakness of NGO and/or EPA. For instance, sections I and II are reective
of the situation in some developing countries. In these sections, the e¤orts of a well-funded
international NGO have come to be more important than governmental enforcement e¤orts.
INECE (2005) states: NGOs, particularly the better-funded international NGOs, run the
risk of outpacing government e¤orts in countries where there is limited government capacity
for enforcement and compliance, and this may present diplomatic problems when governments
consider NGOs as competitors rather than collaborators.
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Section EPA Actions NGO Actions
I strategic substitutes strategic complements
II strategic substitutes strategic substitutes
III strategic complements strategic complements
IV not feasible in equilibrium
Table 1: Taxonomy of strategies
The intuition contained in the taxonomy is relevant for EPA and NGO decision makers
alike. Even if they do not have in mind a formal model of the sort presented here, in making
its decisions about how much e¤ort to expend on encouraging a hostile social atmosphere
a well-functioning NGO should have regard not just to the direct e¤ect on rms, but also
to the induced e¤ect on the behavior of the EPA. The e¢ cacy of its own actions may be
o¤-set (for example) if the EPA responds by scaling back the intensity of its own information-
provision e¤orts. Indeed, this is the case if the equilibrium occurs in sections I and II. In
other circumstances (section III) the EPA will be induced to expand that intensity, and the
NGO will be motivated to push even harder to exploit such crowding-in e¤ects. In parallel
the NGO, as a strategic actor in its own right, will realize that the intensity of the information
provision program that it operates will inuence the incentive that the NGO has to invest in
a hostile community atmosphere.
The taxonomy also allows us to think systematically about the comparative static impacts
of changing various parameters. For instance, consider a change in the preferences of the
NGO in terms of , i.e. how much the NGO cares about environmental costs in comparison
to industry cost. We know from the analysis of the best-response functions (BRFs) that the
NGOs BRF is decreasing in , while the EPAs BRF is not a¤ected by . Referring to Figure
1 we can infer e.g. how the equilibrium outcomes change when the NGO internalizes more/less
of industry costs. If the compliance atmosphere is reected by a NE in sections I and II, the
more the NGO cares about industry prot, the less social penalty it will create but the more
intensively will the EPA audit in equilibrium. In contrast, if the NE is in quadrant III, the
more the NGO cares about industry prot, the less social penalty it will create, and the less
the EPA will audit.
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2.2.1 Equilibrium
In this section, we derive the closed-form solution to the above game between the EPA and
the NGO when both regulators behave non-cooperatively. The solution is found by inverting
the two best-response functions (2) and (3).
Proposition 3 The solution to the game between the EPA and the NGO is:
p =
s
  1
 (+    )2

 A(1  ) + 2(1
2
+ 2   3
2
) + (+    )

;
 =
s
1
 ( + 1)2

A+ 2(
1
2
  )  (1 + )

;
where
A = 
r
1
4
2 + 22   2 + 2 + +    2:
Special Case For tractability, we restrict our attention to one special case of the general
model above. Since our primary focus here is on the characteristics and behaviors of the NGO
we will hold constant the level of environmental damages at  = 1 and EPA costs at  = 1=2.
We continue to capture the cost of the NGO as 0 <  < 1 so that we still analyse relevant
situations where EPA cost is relatively larger or smaller than EPA cost depending on the
atmosphere in the society towards a particular social issue.
For this special case, the solution simplies to:
p =
p
3     22 +B(1  )  1; (4)
 =
1
2
s
  1


 +   1
2
B   1
2

; (5)
where:
B =
p
42   4+ 4 + 1:
The maximum points in the respective best-response functions are given by:
p =
p
 and  = 1=2:
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It is important to note that p can be larger or smaller than p and that  can be larger
or smaller than  depending on parameter values as per our next proposition.
Proposition 4 We have:(
p > p if  < (1  ) and p  p otherwise;
 >  if  < 3=4   and    otherwise:
We note that (1 ) < 3=4  holds true as per our denition of the NGO ( < 1=2). Thus,
if  < (1  ), the equilibrium is in section II; if (1  ) <  < 3=4  , the equilibrium is
in section I; and if 3=4   <  the equilibrium is in section III of the proposed taxonomy.
The Proof is in the Appendix.
In the vicinity of equilibrium the actions of the EPA and NGO can be strategic substitutes
or strategic complements. It is interesting to observe how the equilibrium values for auditing
p and social penalty  change in relation to p and  when varying the exogenous parameters
of the model. For instance, for xed positive , when  is small ( < (1 )), the equilibrium
is in section II (p > p and  > ). That means, the equilibrium actions of EPA and NGO are
both strategic substitutes. As  increases, the equilibrium changes location counterclockwise
(referring to Figure 2) from section II to section I (p < p and  > ) if  is moderate
((1   ) <  < 3
4
  ) and nally to section III (p < p and  < ) for large values of 
(3=4  < ). That means, always when  decreases, the use of  increases which is intuitive.
Lower cost to stir-up public anger results in doing so more. The strategic response from the
EPA depends on the section the equilibrium is situated in. In section I and II, increasing  is
responded with decreasing p (the NGO crowds-out EPA activity) and in section III increasing
 is responded with increasing p (the NGO crowds-in EPA activity). Table 2 summarizes these
insights.
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 > (1  )  < (1  )
 < 3=4  
Section I
p < p
 > 
Section II
p > p
 > 
 > 3=4  
Section III
p < p
 < 
not
feasible
Table 2: Possible equilibria depending on  and .
There are three distinct regulatory environments based on how costly the NGO nds it
to stir-up public anger given the social atmosphere towards the particular issue (captured
by parameter  2 (0; 1)) and by how much the NGO cares about the bottom line of rms
(captured by parameter  2 [0; 1=2)). Small  means it is rather easy for the NGO to motivate
society to levy a public penalty to a non-complying rm. We call such a society alert. On
the contrary, large  means it is rather di¢ cult for the NGO to motivate society to levy a
public penalty to a non-complying rm. We call such a society inattentive. We call a society
attentiveif it is neither alert nor inattentive. In a stylized way the reader may think of how
likely a recipient of a leaet or other message from an NGO is to read it, and therefore how
intensive a communication program the NGO has to mount in order to get its message across.
Furthermore, we call the NGO to be green if  is relatively small, that is the NGO cares
very little about the bottom line of rms but instead it is only concerned with the cause. We
call the NGO business-friendlyif  is relatively large, that is the NGO cares considerably
about the bottom line of rms and about the cause. Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of EPA
and NGO based on  and .
*** Figure 3 here ***
Our taxonomy delivers several new insights, as real-worldregulatory contexts can plau-
sibly be sorted into the taxonomy outlined in Figure 3.
To take a couple of examples, if society is su¢ ciently inattentive ( > 3=4), the equilibrium
is necessarily situated in section III, where more EPA activity is responded by more NGO
activity and vice versa more NGO activity induces more EPA activity. This is reective
of real-world situations where EPAs and NGOs are partners for the cause. If society
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is very attentive about the issue and the NGO is very green, the equilibrium tends to be in
section I, where more EPA activity induces more NGO activity, but more NGO activity causes
a reduction in EPA activity. This is reective of real-worldsituations in some developing
nations where EPAs and NGOs are opponentsin that the EPA would rather hinder the work
of the more radical(hostile to business) NGO. Other cases can be read o¤ and interpreted
analogously.
3 Strategic Delegation: The Optimal NGO Chief
An interesting feature that the taxonomy makes transparent is that outcomes - both envi-
ronmental, and equilibrium e¤orts by state regulator and NGO - are sensitive to the NGOs
objective function. In particular to , the relative weight placed on environmental versus
economic cost impacts, or how business-burden-sensitive (brown) the NGO is in its decision-
making.
This leads naturally to the following question: If I am to delegate my advocacy to an NGO
(say through donation), what sort of objective function would I want it to have in order to
best progress my preferred outcomes?
The leadership of NGOs include former CEOs of companies or global civic leaders - perhaps
in executive functions, or perhaps on boards of control. In exercising discretion they can be
expected to vary in how they trade-o¤ business and economic interests against environmental
outcomes. That is the leadership of an NGO can vary in how deep a shade of green it is in the
way in which it makes operational decisions. A forward-looking NGO donor can reasonably be
expected to account for such strategic considerations when deciding how to assign donations.
We will show that such a NGO donor typically prefers a delegate with a  di¤erent to his or
her own.10 We could alternatively think of a single large founder (Bill Gates) about to give a
million dollars to a green foundation but setting the rules/byelaws/board composition of the
foundation rst. For the rest of this section we will talk of a single donor, but the distinction
is semantic.
If the true tastes or objectives of the donor are described by true, what sort of chief would
they want running the NGO (which we will denote del)? The objective of a founder with
10Or equivalently: an NGO that has designed into its processes and practices that embody a particular
weighting of business interests. The strategic delegation story is most associated with the conservative central
banker analysis of Rogo¤(1985). In a setting in which society - or the government in power - attached particular
weights to ination versus employment outcomes he noted that Society can often make itself better o¤ by
appointing a central banker who does not share the social objective function, but instead places too largea
weight on ination relative to unemployment(Rogo¤ (1985: 1169)). In the spirit of Rogo¤s conclusion, a
single or population of donors to green causes may nd their objectives better served by donating to an NGO
that attached di¤erent weights to the environment/business trade-o¤ than they do themselves.
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true objective captured by true is to choose del to maximize
Z(deljtrue; ; p(del); (del)) =  true(1=2)p22   (1  true)1=2(1  p)2   1=22
with equilibrium actions of EPA p and NGO  themselves depending on del.
Using p(del) from (4) and (del) from (5) and deriving @Z=@del = 0 given true (rst-
order condition) implicitly denes the mapping from true to del. The resulting function
del(true) is complex and we investigate some of its relevant characteristics in the Appendix.
Based on this investigation, we gain the following insights.
Recall rst, that a truly green NGO donor features true = 0. The next proposition
establishes the link between true and del for a truly green NGO donor.
Proposition 5 A deep green donor (one with tastes described by true = 0) will delegate to
an NGO chief with the same tastes as herself (del = 0) if society is su¢ ciently inattentive,
in particular if  = 3=4. She delegates to one less green than herself (del > 0) if society is
su¢ ciently alert ( < 3=4).
The Proof is in the Appendix.
When a green donor (true = 0) truthfully delegates del = 0 and society is su¢ ciently
alert ( < 3=4), the equilibrium occurs in section I of the Taxonomy of Strategies of EPA and
NGO. In section I the EPA actions are strategic substitutes: less NGO activity induces more
EPA activity. In this situation, it is optimal for the donor to delegate to an NGO chief who is
more business-friendly than the donor, del > 0. This is because the best-response function of
the NGO (p) is decreasing in del which is strategically responded by the EPA with increasing
p (which in turn helps to achieve the objective of the green NGO). Thus, the increase in EPA
e¤orts partially o¤sets the decrease in NGO e¤orts while the NGO saves costly resources.
Put di¤erently, in this setting the truly green NGO donor exploits the strategic setting by
delegating to an NGO chief that is more business friendly than the donor.
When a truly green NGO donor (true = 0) truthfully delegates del = 0 and faces a society
that is inattentive towards the issue ( = 3=4), the equilibrium occurs in section III of the
Taxonomy of Strategies of EPA and NGO. In section III both the EPA actions and the NGO
actions are strategic complements: less NGO activity is responded by less EPA activity. In
this situation, it is optimal for the NGO donor to delegate sincerely (appoint an NGO chief
with the same preferences as the donor). In other words del = 0, the NGO chief will not be
business-friendly. In order to understand the intuition behind this result, we observe that if
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the founder were instead to delegate some del > 0 the best-response function of the NGO
(p) would decrease leading to lower  and lower p in equilibrium, contrary to the founders
ultimate objective.
Next, note that a business-friendlyNGO donor features true ! 1=2 ( is marginally
lower than 1=2). The next proposition establishes the link between true and del for a business-
friendly NGO donor.
Proposition 6 A business-friendly donor (one with tastes described by true ! 1=2) will
delegate to an NGO chief with the same tastes as herself (del ! 1=2) if society is su¢ ciently
alert ( < 1=4). She delegates to one more green than herself (del < 0) if society is attentive
or inattentive ( = 1=4).
The Proof is in the Appendix.
We note that a business-friendly NGO donor still overweighs environmental over business
outcomes compared to the EPA. Such a donor is also interested to free-ride on EPA e¤orts
which are free of charge to the NGO. Thus, the donor uses strategic delegation to crowd-in
EPA e¤orts whenever suitable.
When a business-friendly founder (true ! 1=2) truthfully delegates del ! 1=2 and society
is su¢ ciently alert ( < 1=4), the equilibrium occurs in section II of the Taxonomy of Strategies
of EPA and NGO. In section II the EPA actions are strategic substitutes: more NGO activity
induces less EPA activity. In this situation, it is optimal for the donor to delegate sincerely
(appoint an NGO chief whos tastes replicate the ones of the donor). In other words del ! 1=2,
the NGO chief will also be business-friendly. To see why we can observe that if the business-
friendly founder were instead to delegate a more green mission (del < 1=2), NGO activity
 would increase and subsequently EPA activity p would decrease which is contrary to the
objective of the NGO founder.
When a business-friendly founder (true ! 1=2) truthfully delegates del ! 1=2 and society
is su¢ ciently inattentive ( = 1=4), the equilibrium occurs in section III of the Taxonomy
of Strategies of EPA and NGO. In section III both the EPA actions and the NGO actions
are strategic complements: more NGO activity is responded by more EPA activity. In this
situation, it is optimal for the NGO donor to delegate a more green mission. This would
result in increasing NGO activity and also in increasing EPA activity. Again the NGO donor
free-rides on EPA e¤orts and strategically crowds-in EPA e¤orts.
Until now, we have focused on two special cases in terms of NGO characteristics: (i)
true = 0 and (ii) del ! 1=2. Next, we analyze more general cases of true. Figure 4 illustrates
the complete mapping from true to del, i.e. the function del(true) for various levels of .
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*** Figure 4 here ***
The mapping of the true NGO type into the delegated type del(true) is insightful. We
observe from Figure 4 that a su¢ ciently green NGO donor (small true) who faces a su¢ ciently
alert society (small to medium ) delegates to a more business friendly (brown) NGO chief.
The NGO donor does this in order to crowd-in EPA activity as the equilibrium is in sections
I or II. The NGO donor delegates to be more brown and subsequently lowers  which saves
the NGO costly resources while the EPA increases its activity which helps to achieve the true
objective of the NGO. We note that the smaller  the larger tends to be the di¤erence between
del and true.
We also observe from Figure 4 that a su¢ ciently brown NGO donor (large true) who faces
an inattentive or attentive society (medium to large ) delegates more green missions. The
NGO donor does this in order to crowd-in EPA activity as the equilibrium is in sections III.
The NGO donor delegates to be more green and subsequently increases  which is responded
by EPA increasing her activity which helps to achieve the objective of the NGO. We note that
the smaller  the larger tends to be the di¤erence between del and true.
*** Figure 5 here ***
The outcomes from the mapping of true to del can also be illustrated with the help of the
framework of our regulatory taxonomy introduced above. Figure 5 shows that all NGO donors
which face an inattentive society ( = 3=4) delegate a more green mission. The same is true
for brown NGO donors facing an attentive or inattentive community. The NGO does this in
order to crowd-in EPA activity as the equilibrium is in section III. The donor delegates in
such a way as to be less business-friendly and subsequently increases  which cost the NGO
resources, but there is some leverage for these resources. This is because the increase in 
encourages the EPA to increase its activity in turn - due to strategic complementarity in this
range - which further contributes to the true objective of the NGO donor. In other words, if
the NGO has high cost of causing public anger, delegation is always to a deeper green mission.
We further nd that the larger  the more green is the delegated mission.
Note that there are moderate levels of  (i.e.:  = 1=2) where a relatively green NGO donor
(true < 1=4) delegates to a browner-than-self NGO chief; a relatively brown NGO founder
(true > 1=4) delegates to a greener-than-self NGO chief. In each case, the NGO founder uses
strategic delegation to commit to being more moderate.
Another interesting element of Figure 5 is the truthful-delegation-envelope.Along this
envelope, the NGO donor hires an NGO chief who has tastes that coincide with her own.
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For instance, a brown NGO donor (true ! 1=2) hires an equally brown chief (del ! 1=2)
if society is relatively alert (  1=4). Everywhere else, optimal delegation is strategic in
character.
4 Conclusions
When a donor - big or small - gives money to an environmental NGO she is in e¤ect delegating
her advocacy biddingto that NGO. It is therefore natural to ask what sort of surrogate the
donor wants to act in his or her stead. This paper shows that NGO donors typically want to
delegate their bidding to an NGO which trades-o¤ business versus environmental outcomes
di¤erently in comparison to themselves.
Social pressure upon rms is determined endogenously in the model that we have de-
veloped, and is jointly produced between a state regulator and an NGO. Recognizing this
coproduction of social pressure by di¤erent actors with di¤erent instruments and di¤erent
objectives turns out to be critical to understanding the incentives for good corporate behavior
that will emerge. In our stylized set-up the interactions between the EPA and civil NGO turn
out to be complex and nuanced. Reecting this we develop a taxonomy of social enforcement
settings into which real-world environmental regulatory contexts can in principal be catego-
rized. Central to the analysis is that each player recognizes and anticipates the impact of
their own behaviors on the behavior of their coproducer. An NGO will have little interest in
investing more e¤ort to whip-up public angst, for example, if the EPA responds to that extra
e¤ort by scaling back the intensity of its own information-provision. Its pressure-generating
e¤orts would, in that case, be o¤-set or crowded outby the induced reaction. Equally a
welfare-motivated public actor will be sensitive to the virulence of the social atmosphere into
which it disseminates information.
We illustrate how the taxonomy can be used to shed light on the important phenomena of
strategic delegation, and the leadership of NGOs that advocacy donors will nd attractive.11
In particular, how hostile to or collaborative with business will a donor want the NGO to be?
To borrow the terminology that is the organizing theme of Lyons (2012) book - should she
or he appoint a good cop or bad cop?
How should we interpret the model? It is not clear that those that select NGO leaders, or
that donors who decide to which NGOs to donate to, will contemplate rst-order conditions
11As already noted there is a literature on strategic delegation by prot-motivated rm owners to managers
with non-prot-maximising intent (for examples Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987)). Research in that
area goes further in considering a wider set of personality attributes(aggressiveness, resilience, stubbornness,
and so on) that the principal might nd attractive in his agent. For a seminal empirical examination of this
sort see Miller and Toulouse (1986).
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and taxonomy diagrams of the sort presented here. However it is plausible to think that over
time those NGOs - or NGO leaders - that best deliver outcomes favorable to the preferences of
donors would come to ourish. Indeed it would be straight-forward to develop a model with
plausible evolutionary or e¢ ciency-seekingproperties in which the type of NGO leader with
the preferred del would rise to the top. That preferred del for a given underlying or true
set of tastes is what we have characterized here. Developing some empirical insight - either
from statistical data or case study analyses - is an important ambition of future research.
Importantly the solutions have regard to the strategic interdependence that quite obviously
exists between the pressure-generating actions of the state agency and that of civil society
organizations, which has been ignored in existing work. The analysis provides a framework
within which to think about how the state and the donor contributions inuence the incentives
for environmental and social good practice.
There are various ways in which the analysis might usefully be extended. One would be
to provide a more explicit micro-foundation to how exactly the NGO generates social penalty.
A second would be to allow for the coexistence of multiple NGOs with perhaps competing
objectives. A third would be to consider, in a repeated setting, the role that reputation might
play in insulating rms found to be behaving badly from subsequent social sanction.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 4
First,  >  is equivalent to condition @p()
@
< 0 evaluated at equilibrium. The BRF (with
 = 1=2 and  = 1) is:
p() = 2

42 + 1
and the relevant derivative is:
@p()
@
=  2 4
2   1
(42 + 1)2
:
Condition @p()
@
< 0 can only hold if 42   1 > 0 which is equivalent to:
  1
2

4 + 2 
p
42   4+ 4 + 1  1

> 0
4 + 2 
p
42   4+ 4 + 1  1 < 0
4 + 2  1 <
p
42   4+ 4 + 1
(4 + 2  1)2 < 42   4+ 4 + 1
162 + 2(4)(2  1) + (2  1)2 < 42   4+ 4 + 1
162 + 2(4)(2  1) + (2  1)2   42 + 4  4   1 < 0
4 (4 + 4  3) < 0
4 + 4  3 < 0
 +  < 3=4
 < 3=4  :
Second, p > p is equivalent to condition @(p)
@p
< 0 evaluated at equilibrium. The BRF is:
(p) =
p(1  )
p2 + 
and the relevant derivative is:
@(p)
@p
=
 
   p2 (1  )
(p2 + )2
:
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Condition @(p)
@p
< 0 can only hold if    p2 < 0 which is equivalent to
   (3     22 +B(1  )  1) < 0
2   3+ 22  B(1  ) + 1 < 0
2   3+ 22 + 1 < B(1  )
(2   3+ 22 + 1)2 < B2(1  )2
(2   3+ 22 + 1)2 < (42   4+ 4 + 1)(1  )2
(2   3+ 22 + 1)2   (42   4+ 4 + 1)(1  )2 < 0
4
 
2   +  < 0
2   +  < 0
(1  ) > 
Third, we note that 3
4
   > (1  ) is true because  < 1=2.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 5 and Proposition 6
The objective of a founder with true objective captured by true is to choose del to maximize:
Z(deljtrue; ; p(del); (del)) =  true(1=2)p22   (1  true)1=2(1  p)2   1=22
with equilibrium actions of EPA p and NGO  themselves depending on del.
Using p(del) from (4) and (del) from (5) and deriving @Z=@del = 0 given true implic-
itly denes the mapping from true to del. The resulting function del(true) is complex and
we investigate some of its characteristics in two main steps e¤ectively proong Proposition 5
and Proposition 6.
First, we note that it is not possible to isolate @Z=@del = 0 for del depending on true, but
alternatively it is possible to isolate for true depending on del, that is true(del), which is the
inverse of the function of interest. The next Figure illustrates this inverse function true(del)
for some example values of : for  ! 0 (lower envelope), for  ! 1 (upper envelope) and
also for  = f1=4; 1=2; 3=4g.
*** Figure 6 here ***
Second, we investigate function del(true) more generally ( not specied) at particular
values for true: (a) at true = 0 and (b) at true ! 1=2.
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(a) We evaluate condition @Z=@ = 0 restricted for true = del = 0. We nd that this
condition is solely solved by  = 3=4. From the examples above we know that del(true) > 0
if  < 3=4 and that del(true) < 0 if  > 3=4. Thus, a green NGO founder (true = 0)
truthfully delegates to be green (del = 0) if NGO costs are relatively high ( = 3=4). And
the same NGO founder delegates to be more business-friendly (del > 0) if NGO costs are
relatively low ( < 3=4). This proves Proposition 5.
(b) We evaluate condition @Z=@ = 0 restricted for true = del = 1=2. We nd that this
condition is solely solved by  = 1=4. From the examples above we know that del(true) > 0
if  < 1=4 and that del(true) < 0 if  > 1=4. Thus, a business-friendly NGO founder
(true ! 1=2) truthfully delegates to be business-friendly (del ! 1=2) if NGO costs are
relatively high ( = 1=4). And the same NGO founder delegates to be more green (del > 0)
if NGO costs are relatively low ( < 1=4). This proves Proposition 6.
The insights above allow to derive Figure 4 for del(true) in the main paper.
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Figure 6: Inverse function true(del) for  ! 0 (lower envelope), for  ! 1 (upper envelope)
and also for  = f1=4; 1=2; 3=4g.
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